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Assessing the state of knowledge on ‘social dimensions of public policies 
and their impact on crime’ is one aspect of a reflection on crime 
prevention and public policies. Crime prevention is embedded in various 
traditions, socio-legal contexts and socio-economic backgrounds. 
Therefore we need a preliminary assessment of the crime dynamics and 
socio-economic situations in Europe. To draw this portrait, considering 
the states as units, we will first look at the crime dynamics during the last 
decades. We will then compare the countries in terms of crime levels and 
socio economic situations. It would have been better to compare crime 
dynamics and socio-economic evolutions but it is difficult due to the lack 
of comparative data. By the same token, the state level is not necessarily 
the best unit, and we will try to provide in a later comparison involving, 
at least for the biggest countries, infra-national units. 
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Sources 
   
1 - On crime rates 
 
The data compiled by the group of ‘The European Sourcebook Project’ 
on crime, initialy headed by the Council of Europe, give a valuable 
departure point. Three releases of the sourcebook have been published : 
a preliminary one for the period 1990-1995, a second one covering the 
years 1995-2000, and a third one about the years 2000-2003. Rate of 
offences and offenders, prison population are available on a comparative 
basis1. We used complementarily the Home Office Intenational Statistics 
(Barclays and al. 2001). We could add European victimizations surveys 
(ICVS, cf. Van Dijk and al.) 
As far as prevention is concerned, we need to evaluate the level of 
different categories of crime, the proportion of offenders among youth 
and adult population, the detention rate. We will consider the number of 
offences per 100 000 population and the number of offenders per 
100 000 by categories of offences.  
 
 
2 - On socio-economic situation in European countries 
 
Different sources - Eurostat social cohesion data2, OECD, ILO, The 
Luxembourg Income Survey - provide standardised measures of the 
socio-economic context: measures of per capita income, percent of 
people under poverty threshold, inequalities, unemployment, but also 
social indicators about percent of people under poverty level, before and 
after social transfers, school dropouts, families without employment and 
dependant children. 
Dynamics of overall crime and crime level in European countries 
 
The rate of offences recorded by the police (per 100 000 population) has 
been rising in Europe throughout the last fifty years. Starting in 1960, the 
offences’ rates grow at the same pace in UK, Germany, France, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark up to the mid-eighties. The Netherlands lag two 
or three years behind. In Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal the rising of 
crime rates has waited until the mid-seventies, and in these countries the 
growth rate remained below the level of the north-western European 
countries. A third group of nations - Poland Hungary, and other eastern 
countries - experiences no growth in crime rate up to the nineties, and, if 
the rise is very sharp by this time, the offences’ rate in these countries 
remain far lower than in the first nations mentioned.  
 
                                                 
1 A goal of the WP6 could be to provide comment on the reliability of these data in 
relation to socio-economic indicators. 
2 Only available for the period 1995-2006. 
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Source: author’s computations from Barclays & al., Home Office, 2001. 
 
It is obvious that crime growth in each country is linked to the 
development of a market economy and to the degree of integration of 
this country in the world economy3. Spain under Franco, Portugal under 
Salazar, Greece under the ‘Colonels’ are not fully integrated to the 
modern world economy ; Italy, an open democratic country since the 
end of the second World War, is a fragmented nation with a south 
lagging behind an industrialised north : all these countries have lower 
crime rates than northern ones. In eastern countries, crime rate stayed at 
a low level up to 1990; the nineties, which involve a quick shift toward 
the market economy and a release of the former social control linked to 
the communist regime (Komsomols, Unions, etc.), has been 
accompanied by soaring crime rates. In every nation, the rise of the 
overall rate is strongly linked to the growth of property crime –motor 
vehicle theft, burglary, other larceny and theft in general. The crime 
curves of the various European nations reflect at first glance the 
entrance pace in the modern market economy. 
 
We will now compare countries synchronically, considering average 
levels during the last two decades, or splitting the period, when it is 
sound, according to the ‘waves’ of the European sourcebook.  
 
The crime rate reflects to a large extent the importance of property 
crime. If we are to interpret crime differences between countries, we 
must distinguish, at least very roughly, property crime and violent crime. 
This raises difficulties when dealing with offences like robbery for which 
the motivation is to steal but the modus operandi depends on the 
accessibility of violent means. 
 
Let consider an offence which is emblematic of violent crime : the mean 
rate of completed homicide for 1990-2003. There is a clear split between 
European nations: the eastern countries - Albania, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia - have all homicide rates above 8/100 000, the 
highest levels in Europe. Conversely, homicide rates in northwestern 
countries are at the lowest levels : between 1 and 2/100 000.  
 
                                                 
3 Of which the part of export plus import in the GDP is a possible measure. 
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 Because of the very encompassing definition of the category ‘assault’, 
which seems to be recorded in very different ways according to national 
definitions and policy priorities, it is difficult to consider it as a good 
indicator of violent crime. Moreover there are inconsistencies in the data 
published concerning assault in the European Sourcebook. 
 
The robbery rate seems to be more reliable: its distribution is loosely 
correlated to the homicide rate distribution. Whereas homicide is 
negatively correlated to all categories of property crime, the association 
between robbery and property crimes is moderate but direct, showing 
the dual meaning of robbery. 
 
An offence which is characteristic of property crime - motor vehicle 
theft - is, during the same period 1990-2003, recorded much more often 
in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, UK, Ireland, Belgium but also 
among countries of south west Europe - France, Italy, Spain than in 
other European countries. This is also true, to a large extent, for 
domestic burglary. 
Motor vehicle theft, burglary and other property crime are negatively 
correlated with homicide in Europe during the last two decades.  
 
There are two patterns of criminality, still clearly observable at the end of 
the twentieth century in Europe. The crime structure of the wealthiest 
Western and Northern countries is defined by a low homicide rate, but 
often fairly strong robbery rate and a high non-violent property crime 
rate; the crime structure of the East European countries is characterised 
by high homicide rates and low motor vehicle theft, and medium 
burglary rates. 
 
The southern European countries are the lowest on most crime indexes. 
But, with respect to crime a converging process is on its way, as in most 
socio-economic domains, and the boundaries between the three groups 
of countries we have delineated is much more blurred in 2007 than it 
was at the beginning of the nineties. 
 
The social context: wealth, inequalities and crime 
 
Reducing poverty, unemployment, school failure and alleviating some 
consequences of family disruption could impact on the propensity to 
engage in crime activity and foster social cohesion. Implicitly, it relies on 
the hypothesis that inequalities, unemployment and crime are correlated. 
All the available knowledge shows that this is not a simple and 
straightforward relationship. For example, when dealing with time series, 
economists and sociologists debate about the complex link between 
income, prices, unemployment rates and crime rates (see time series 
analysis performed by Field 1990 ; Hale 1998 ; Deadman, Pyle 1994 ; 
Lagrange 2001). Socio economic tensions boost crime levels, but it is 
difficult to distinguish the role of increased opportunities associated with 
the amount of goods circulating, from the role of motivation  stemming 
for a decrease in legal income as a consequence of rising unemployment. 
Moreover, the nature of the relationship is historically contingent (see 
Cantor, Land 1985; Carlson, Michalovski, 1993). Crime is not motivated 
in the same manner during high growth rate periods - like the sixties and 
the seventies in Europe - and low growth rate periods - like the nineties.  
We will not summarize here the results of these studies; our aim is much 
more limited. It is only to establish a macro-social descriptive framework 
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 in which the debate on prevention policies can be outlined meaningfully. 
To provide this macro-social context, we will give some very basic 
elements on inequalities, including welfare provisions aimed at reducing 
these inequalities, and give rudimentary correlations between these 
indicators of social cohesion - or lack of social cohesion - and crime 
rates. 
 
For the period 1980-2003, computed ratios of earning income between 
the 1st quintile and the 5th quintile show that earning inequalities have 
increased in Poland, UK, slightly in Denmark, The Netherlands, 
decreased in France, been stable in Sweden. They are not available for 
Spain, Italy, and Greece4. But, except in the case of Poland, the 
evolution of earnings inter-quintile ratios for the whole period 1980-
2003 is not conspicuous. Therefore comparing means levels on the last 
20 years is sound. The Gini-coefficient of disposable income adjusted for 
family size around 2000 is strongly correlated with the earnings inter-
quintile ratio for the period 1995-2005 (0.91). The trend in long-term 
unemployment for the same period 1995-2005 are neither significantly 
linked to GDP per capita nor to inequalities. 
 
Few results emerge when comparing crime rates and socio-economic 
inequalities or cohesion indexes.  
 
1/ Homicide rates are fairly well correlated with inequalities, the 
coefficient is stronger with Gini (0.59***)5 than with the earnings inter-
quartile ratio. Conversely homicide is negatively correlated with income 
per capita (-0.61***). 
 
2/ Robbery is also directly correlated with inequalities measured by 
earnings inter-quintile ratio (0.44**), but not significantly with income 
per capita. 
 
3/ Motor vehicle theft is strongly correlated with income per capita 
(0.62***) and inversely linked to income inequalities (Gini being the best 
correlate -0.43*). 
 
4/ Domestic burglary is directly correlated with income per capita, 
0.59*** for the period 1995-99, 0.42* for the years 2000-03, but not 
correlated with inequalities.  
 
5/ Motor vehicle theft, and to a lesser extent (there are some 
discrepancies in the measures) domestic burglary and robbery are 
negatively correlated with long-term unemployment trends, but non-
significantly at usual levels. This last result is, at first glance, surprising: in 
fact this long-term unemployment trend is positive, sometimes in 
countries where property crime is high like France, and sometimes where 
it is low like Poland. 
 
6/ Risk of poverty after social transfers if loosely correlated to robbery, 
but not with other main crime indexes. 
 
7/ For the period 1995-2005, the average percent of youth under 25 
years dropping out school without a diploma, is strongly correlated with 
                                                 
4 Employment in Europe, European commission, September 2005.  
5 * Means significant at the 5% level, ** at the 1%, *** at the 1/1000. 
 5
 the level of income inequality (Gini index of income inequality adjusted 
for family size). This is a measure of the lack of social cohesion, 
independent of the various crime rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations from the Sourcebook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, calculations from OECD questionnaire on distribution 
of household incomes 1999-2000 
 
Most European social and economic policies, under the label social 
cohesion, aim to reduce income inequalities between nations and among 
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 nations between regions. To what extent will this convergence, at the 
ecological - national or regional - level, give way to a reduction in 
interpersonal income inequalities? The question is open. These policies 
will certainly lead to a converging crime pattern in Europe, which is not 
the case at the moment. Certain effects will certainly be positive, like a 
probable reduction in homicide rates in eastern European countries. 
Meanwhile, analysis by L. Chauvel (in Lagrange, 2006), tend to show that 
there is only a weak relation between inter-individual inequalities and 
inequalities between nations; it is therefore important to check if the 
convergence process between nations is accompanied by an increased 
cohesion within each country or region. 
This very rough macro-analysis does not allow us to tell whether 
reducing inequalities is liable to reduce school dropouts’ rate and non 
lethal violent juvenile crime but this is fairly plausible. 
 
As far as property crime is concerned, the effects of economic growth 
are much more complex. Reducing unemployment will reduce property 
crime motivated by lack of opportunities to get jobs. But we also know 
that economic development, when it destroy community bonds and 
reinforce wide anonymous settlements, can impact negatively on 
property crime by enlarging opportunities. 
 
Table 1 - Crime rates in Europe 1990-2003  (European Sourcebook 
1995-2003) 
 
 
 
per 100 
000 
Hom
icide
com
plete
d 
 
Assault 
Motor
_vehic.
_theft
Domestic 
burglary 
 
Robbery 
 1990
-
2003
1995
-
1999
2000
-
2003
1990-
2003
1990-
1994
1995
-
1999
2000-
2003 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999
2000-
2003
Albania 11,3 7 4 6 21 11 10 8 13 8 
Armenia 2,9 32 41 4   26  6 8 
Austria 1,1 392 418 103 205 159 162 31,2 26 42 
Belgium 1,7 523 590 436  628 774  155 256 
Bulgaria 4,6 11 2 77 265 342  54 68 58 
Croatia 2,7 26 25 53  60 82 14 13 22 
Cyprus 1,2 16 14 24  156 134 2 3 6 
Czech 
Republic
1,7 75 69 249 159 129 112 38 42 48 
Denmark 1,2 164 190 745 668 632 627 43 45 59 
Estonia 12,9 28 26 143 408 501 524 153 238 286 
Finland 3,4 480 540 442 243 207 159 46 42 44 
France 2,5 140 198 743 407 383 344 119 139 205 
Georgia 5,1 9 13 6     6 23 
Germany 1,6 408 496 227 353 369 273 67 80 71 
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 Luxemb. 1,1 268 270 184 201 528 372 67 67 82 
Malta 1,2 157 207 285 170 161 176 50 64 41 
Moldova  7,9 12 9  136 124  62 71 56 
Netherlands 1,6 225 303 295 738 716 0 96 88 125 
Norway 1,0 61 78 497 441 298 139 25 30 40 
Poland 2,3 80 81 130 176 176 186 44 73 110 
Portugal 3,4 379 466 230 215 225 204 133 123 179 
Romania 3,1 31 46 9 83 112 69 16 18 14 
Russia 12,7 34 37 28 239 201 215 19 87 49 
Slovakia 2,5 77 72 120  72 56  24 27 
Slovenia 1,8 23 20 60 123 53 140 12 31 26 
Spain 1,1 41 47 313  217  220 216 241 
Sweden 1,2 632 680 858 240 193 189 69 65 99 
Switzerland 1,2 62 80 332  487 336 62 46 54 
Macedonia 2,2   33 10 10  4 7  
Ukraine 9,2 32 19 12   139  71 21 
England  
Wales 
1,5 574 1040 861 1276 1073 791 98 131 199 
Northern 
 
Ireland 
3,7 597 1305 544 486 524 534 109 77 119 
Scotland 2,3 1081 1207 644 1223 655 442 112,6 98 87 
 
Appendices 
 
Motor vehicle theft : mean per  100 000 population 1990-2003  (vertical), 
and Gini disposable income inequality adjusted for family size around 
2000 (horizontal) 
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Homicide completed, mean 1990-2003 (vertical) and gini income inequality around 2000 
(horizontal) 
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Inter-correlation between socio economic indicators 
             |GDP p.cap  Trend lg term   Ratio earnings 
               95-2003  unemploy. 95-05  1/5 quintile 
                          | 
Trend lg term     |  -0.2229     
Unemployment  |  (0.2281)° 
                          |       31         
Ratio1/5            |  -0.4299      0.1006      
Quintile             |  (0.0112)    (0.5904) 
                          |       34          31         
Gini                   |  -0.6247     -0.0153        0.9120      
Household         |  (0.0001)    (0.9383)      (0.0000) 
Income 2000-05|       34           28           30         
             
° Number in parenthesis are levelof signif.,intergers below represent the number of 
countries included 
 
Correlation between different categories of offences rate in Europe 1990-2003 
             homi_~04  rob9094  rob9599 rob20~03 mot_v~03 dom9094 
dom9599 
              
Robbery 9094 |  -0.0257    
                       |   0.8833 
                       |       35       
                       | 
Robbery 9599 |   0.1279   0.9019     
                       |   0.4254   0.0000 
                       |       41       35       
                       | 
  Rob 2000_03 |   0.1736   0.8118   0.8015    
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              |   0.2905   0.0000   0.0000 
             |       39       33       39       
             | 
mot_vehic~03 |  -0.3824   0.4338   0.3761   0.4095  
             |   0.0163   0.0104   0.0183   0.0119 
             |       39       34       39       37       
             | 
 domburg9094 |  -0.2547   0.5252   0.4323   0.3689   0.6788     
             |   0.1824   0.0034   0.0192   0.0534   0.0001 
             |       29       29       29       28       28       
             | 
 domburg9599 |  -0.2005   0.4683   0.4844   0.4924   0.6402   0.8994     
             |   0.2482   0.0060   0.0032   0.0031   0.0000   0.0000 
             |       35       33       35       34       34       29       
             | 
dombu2000-03 |  -0.0820   0.5581   0.6339   0.6671   0.6130   0.6685   
0.7906  
             |   0.6555   0.0020   0.0001   0.0000   0.0002   0.0003   0.0000 
             |       32       28       32       32       32       25       30 
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